The title explains it all. Since this is an area of new research, philosophical and foundational questions abound. As usual, the dividing line between these and the strictly scientific questions is non-existent. This volume can be regarded as "cognitive science meets metaethics". Particularly up for discussion is the nature (or whether there is such a nature) of moral intuitions.

The papers are quite clear and very thought provoking. The editor is also to be commended for using the author/critics/reply to critics format - it makes it clear where some of the dialectic on an issue has gone/is going.

The title explains it all. Since this is an area of new research, philosophical and foundational questions abound. As usual, the dividing line between these and the strictly scientific questions is non-existent. This volume can be regarded as "neuroscience meets metaethics". Particularly up for discussion is the nature of moral development.

The papers are quite clear and very thought provoking. The editor is also to be commended for using the author/critics/reply to critics format - it makes it clear where some of the dialectic on an issue has gone/is going.

A continuation of the above volume. This volume includes article-length responses to the first volume on the part of several critics, the responses to those responses, further analysis of Kant and Sidgwick's claims, a brief discussion of Nietzsche and more metaphysics and epistemology needed for the over-all project. It is the first of these last two where I have the most concern. Parfit spends a lot of time defending a notion of realism about possibilia; his defense is one through the use of "there are" vs. "exist" and several senses of "exist" which are not made clear - needless to say the contrast to "space and time" are the usual confused bits often echoed (what about relationalism?). More crucially, however, I would like to see an attempt to render the view contrasts Parfit states in a non-Indo-European language. I suspect it would show that the viewpoint is at least difficult. (This is related to the perennial story of "Plato's Beard".) Another deep mystery in Parfit's views is the thesis that moral truths are supposed to be in some sense necessary. Inadequate attention is paid to what notion of necessity is at work here. As usual, the confusion over logical necessity is present, but he does not seem to think that this is the right notion anyway (good thing too, since I am ignoring the problems logical pluralism creates for Parfit altogether here). However, these metaphysical objections aside, I dare say that syntheses of ethics with metaphysics are welcome, even if I have many reservations about the detail. A stylistic bonus, too is Parfit's writing style: most of the claims and such are labeled with labels, which allows easy reference in papers, discussion, etc.

A specific collection of papers on this popular topic for ethical discussion and motivation. Of course, I think the debate here (as is the case in many ethical concerns) has a root in a metaphysical problem or disagreement, so I find the arguments in many of these papers unconvincing to me or on behalf of my presumed opponents. The papers themselves seem to have high regard within the debate as ordinarly understood, and that seems fair enough, if you grant the (unrealistic, IMO, if the debate is to be resolved) expectation to not talk about metaphysics.

In the case of this collection, however, I hope that recent trends to discussing responsibility, etc. informed by physiological psychology, the social sciences etc. continue and many of the armchair approaches to moral psychology are rendered increasingly obselete.

(Added after original comment: see the 3 volumes "Moral Psychology", above, for an impression of some related necessary work.)

See my paper on this one. It too needs desperately to be informed by the sciences of responsibility. (Again, I suspect the authors want to avoid metaphysics because of the lack of agreement people have here, particularly as it pertains to the mind-body problem.)

A collection of papers regarded by some experts as being the best on the subject indicated by the title. (I have never done serious work in ethics, so beats the heck out of me as to whether this view is justified.)

Peter Singer defends his controversial views on euthanasia, animal rights, vegetarianism, etc. in this collection of papers. Includes a recipe for lentils, which I have tried. It is pretty good, though should be made spicier.